

Statement of U Thein Maung, M.A., LL.B., (Cantab),  
Barrister-at-Law, sometime Advocate-General of Burma.

I, U Thein Maung, having been asked by the Deputy Chief of Police, No. 1 Area, to prepare a statement of my work and activities since March 1942, state as follows:-

1. I had served loyally and to the best of my ability in and under the (British) Government of Burma over five years before March, 1942.  
(a) first as Minister for Education, (b) then as a Member of the Public Services Commission and (c) again as Advocate-General.
2. I was appointed Advocate-General in January, 1938 and I was serving as such in March, 1942 at Sagaing where I had evacuated my office since 23rd February, 1942 hoping that the tide of Japanese invasion would be stemmed successfully below Pyinmana and Magwe.
3. I held the said appointment and remained at my post till Sagaing was actually occupied by the Japanese at the beginning of May, 1942.
4. A few days after the said occupation, the Japanese Military Police ordered the presiding nun of the Thameintaw Gyaung, Sagaing Hills, i.e. of the Gyaung where I was staying with my family and some members of my office staff, to vacate her Kyaung immediately, and opened an office there. I believe that I was under their surveillance since then.
5. A few days later the Japanese Military Police officer in charge of the said office asked several prominent refugees in the Sagaing Hills including Sir J. A. Maung Gyi, Sir Maung Gye, U Aye (somewhile Home Minister), U Ba Yin (somewhile Minister for Education), U Ba Aye, K.S.M., A.T.M., (somewhile a Member of the Public Service Commission) and myself to move into Sagaing town proper and to occupy houses allotted by him. So I had to move into the town and occupy the house which was directly in front of the new Japanese Military Police Office.

6. I had to stay in the said house till the 17th August, 1942, i.e., a little over three months and during the said period I was horrified at what I saw and heard of the cruelty of the Japanese Military Police.
7. I was taken by the Japanese Military Police Officer to Maymyo on the 19th May, 1942, along with others, viz., U Aye (somewhile Home Minister), U Ba Yin (somewhile Minister for Education), U Ba Pe (somewhile a prominent M.H.K.) and Dr. U Set, C.I.E., (somewhile Municipal Commissioner of the Rangoon Corporation). There we met some Japanese Army Officers who asked us how Burma should be governed and how peace and order could be restored.
8. On return from Maymyo the same evening, U Aye, U Ba Yin and myself had to pass the night in Mandalay in the dormitory of the Japanese Military Police with some officers and men of the said force.
9. A Japanese Military Officer, who was then popularly known as Bo Mogyo, sent for Sir Maung Gye and myself while he was in Mandalay in the same month of May, I believe, Sir Maung Gye had a talk with him first. After that he merely informed me that he had no more time, that he had said what he had to say to Sir Maung Gye and that the letter would give me the necessary information. Sir Maung Gye then told me that Bo Mogyo desired that he (Sir Maung Gye) and I should neither expect nor accept any office under the Japanese regime and that he had very willingly given him (Bo Mogyo) the assurance not only for himself but also on my behalf. I then told Sir Maung Gye that I heartily agreed with him that I had no desire to serve under the Japanese and that he had rightly given the assurance on my behalf also. The assurance so given was announced in a Mandalay paper within a day or two thereafter.
10. I left Sagaing on the 17th August, 1942, with the consent of the Japanese Military Police Officer and arrived at Rangoon two days later.
11. On arrival at Rangoon I found that my house (No.24-28 Kennedy Street Rangoon) was being used as a Vaccination Depot by the Japanese and I had to go and get it back from what was then known as the Hiraoka Commission.



12. I had to stay in Rangoon till the beginning of October, 1942, as the house was returned to me expressly for my own personal residence.
13. I removed from Rangoon to Paungde with my family at the beginning of October, 1942, and I let my house (No. 28 Kennedy Street, Rangoon) to the People's Bank as I intended to live at Paungde till after the war was over.
14. In April, 1943, i.e., while I was at Paungde and nearly a year after the British had evacuated Burma, I received a telegraphic message from Dr. Ba Maw, who was then Premier under the Japanese Military Administration, asking me to serve as a member of the Burmese Independence Preparatory Commission and to help in the preparation of a Constitution for the Government of Burma. The message was sent to the District Commissioner, Promé (U Thein Nyun) and the latter sent a Police Officer to deliver it to me personally at Paungde.
15. I received a letter also from Sir Mya Bu (somewhat a Judge in the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon) urging me to serve on the said Commission. The letter gave me the impression that it was the desire, if not a command, of the Japanese Military Administration and that it would be improper, if not risky, to refuse to serve on the Commission. This impression was confirmed by other information.
16. I also received information that such prominent personages as Dr. Sir San C. Po, Sir Mya Bu, Sir U Thwin, Dr. U Set, C.I.E., U Ayo (somewhat Home Minister) and U Tun Pe (somewhat M.H.R. for the University of Rangoon), whose loyalty to the British Government could not be doubted, would also be members of the said Commission.
17. Under the said circumstances and in view of the fact that I had taken a prominent part in connection with the last two constitutions for the Government of Burma, e.g., as a member of the Burma Deputation to London in 1919-20 and as a member of the Burma Delegation to give evidence before the Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament in 1933-34, I felt that I had no excuse, which would be acceptable to the Japanese Military Administration, for refusal to serve on the said Commission.

18. I also felt that civil government under a properly framed constitution would be much better than Japanese Military Administration without any Constitution whatsoever and that I would be failing in my duty to my people and to my country if, I did not help in framing a Constitution for the Government of Burma which would terminate the said Administration.
19. Furthermore, a Japanese Military Officer came to my house at Paungde with the District Commissioner, Prome (U Thein Nyun) and inquired why I had not gone to Rangoon to serve on the said Commission.
20. So I came from Paungde to Rangoon on the 4th May 1943 and served on the said Commission.
21. I soon found (1) that the Commission did not have a free hand and (2) that the Japanese Military Authorities, on whose behalf Major-General Isomura attended most of the meetings, interfered at almost every turn sometimes openly by messages delivered or communicated to the Chairman (Dr. Ba Maw) or to the Negotiations Committee of the Commission (with instructions to treat them as military secrets) and sometimes by private talks and interviews with some members.
22. I also found (1) that they wanted the Constitution to be framed in such a way that all power should be vested in one person viz., Dr. Ba Maw in order most probably that they themselves might be able to get everything done by putting pressure on him (2) that Dr. Ba Maw, who had styled himself as Arnarshin (Dictator) even before British evacuation of Burma, was naturally in favour of all power being centralized and (3) that Dr. Ba Maw and the then Ministers (with the exception of Thakin Tun Ok and Thakin Ba Sein) formed a very powerful bloc.
23. So I had to take a leading part in the Commission and to fight hard against them. I trust that most of the members of the Commission, if not all, will testify that I fought courageously and persistently for the people of Burma and that I succeeded to a certain extent in liberalizing the constitution.



24. The Commission had to appoint a Negotiations Committee at the very outset. The duty of this Committee was to negotiate on various questions of national importance with the Japanese Military Authorities, through a Committee which they had set up specially for this purpose. As a member of the said Committee I found that there was more of dictation by the Japanese Committee than of negotiation, which was permitted, and that several questions of vital importance had to be left, at their instance, for settlement after Declaration of Independence.
25. The Commission had to submit the various parts of the Constitution to the Japanese Military Authorities, as soon as they were ready, for transmission to and for the approval of the Japanese Government.
26. The Japanese Military Authorities asked the Commission to prepare a Declaration of Independence. In fact a draft Declaration was supplied by them to indicate what they expected of the Commission, and I believe that the Declaration as drafted by the Commission had to be sent to them for approval.
27. The Commission was responsible to a considerable extent, though not entirely (for the reasons already stated), for the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.
28. However, the Commission was absolutely innocent of the Declaration of War which was made by Dr. Ba Maw in his capacity as the Head of State on the 1st August, 1943. The Commission did not know anything about it till it was formally made by him then. Many of them were about to leave the Government House as they were under the impression that the business for the day was over. They were very much surprised when they were called back and the Declaration was made. As a matter of fact the Declaration was not on the agenda for the day at all. Please see annexure A which is a copy of the Detailed Programme of the Functions on the Day of the Burmese Independence.
29. The same must be said of the new Ministers (including myself) who were sworn in on that day. I am not sure whether the old Ministers knew that the Declaration would be made; but think that they also did not know till it was actually made.

30. The main reasons for which I accepted office as Minister for Judicial Affairs are as follows:-

- (1) I was asked by the Chief of the Political Department of the Japanese Military Administration (Mr. Ozeko) to accept office and cooperate with Dr. Ba Maw, who had been chosen and honoured by the Tenno Heika and I believed that refusal to do so would, under the circumstances which were prevailing then, be harmful. My apprehension was justified though ex post facto and somewhat indirectly, by the fact that Thakin Tun Ok and Thakin Ba Sein, who generally followed my lead in the said Commission, were exiled from Burma shortly after Dr. Ba Maw became the Head of State.
- (2) At the same time I realised (a) that actual transfer of civil power from the Japanese Military Authorities had yet to be obtained and (b) that abolition of the Japanese Military Administration would be of no effect in actual practice if the Civil Government were weak and the influence of the Japanese Military Authorities remained as before.
- (3) I felt that negotiations made by the Negotiations Committee of the Commission must be continued, till the respective questions were settled, to safeguard the interests of Burma and her people as against Japan and her ambitions in the various spheres of life and activity. As a member of the said Committee I had been able to gauge Japan's intentions and the extent to which the interests of the country and the people might suffer on account of Japan, and since then I had become much more anxious than I was before.
- (4) I felt that a good deal remained to be done in order that the Burmese people might be free from oppression by the Japanese Army, the Japanese Military Police, their followers and the Japanese Commercial people.
- (5) I felt that the independence of the Burmese judiciary and magistracy must be made real and that Japanese attempts to interfere with their administration of justice must be stopped.
- (6) I felt that law and order must be strictly maintained in the interests of the country.



- (7) I felt that I would be failing in my duty to my country if I refused to accept responsibility under the said circumstances.
- (8) I also felt that there could be no objection on the part of the British because:-
- (a) it was to their interest also that law and order should be maintained in the country,
- (b) H.E. the Governor of Burma is reported to have already broadcasted that people could serve under the Japanese regime and (c) I had waited over a year before accepting office.
31. During my tenure of office as Minister for Judicial Affairs, I have always protested against Japanese encroachments on the rights of the Burmese Government and the people of Burma not only in matters which were under the Ministry but also in other matters which were placed before the Council of Ministers. I trust that all my colleagues on the said Council would support this statement of mine.
32. A copy of the gist of my statement to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief on the 18th November, 1944, is annexed hereto as a sample of my efforts to safeguard the interests of the people. It will throw some side light on my work and activities. I may mention that Sir Mya Bu and others were present when I made the statement to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief and that Sir Mya Bu supported me as regards Japanese interference with administration of justice and proclamation of martial law. Five flaps relating to some of the cases which I had in mind at the time of making the said statement are submitted herewith.
33. Japanese Military Authorities posted Japanese military guards and detectives at the residence of all Ministers from the 1st April, 1945. i.e., a few days after the Burmese Army started attacking Japanese Forces to the 24th April, 1945, i.e. a few days before their final evacuation of Rangoon; and the detectives accompanied them (the Ministers) wherever they went.

34. On the 24th April, 1945, all Ministers were asked to evacuate Rangoon. I then led the Opposition, as it were stating inter alia (1) that the interests of peace and order not only in Rangoon but throughout the country, which had not yet been reoccupied by the British, required that the Ministers should remain in Rangoon and (2) that they, as leaders, should share the fate of the people instead of leaving them in the lurch, as suggested, however hard Rangoon might be attacked by the British and Americans.
35. I have remained behind in Rangoon for the above reasons and also for the reason that my conscience is clear. I have done my best (1) to protect the interests of the people of Burma against the Japanese, (2) to maintain law and order in the country in spite of the war and (3) to see that the Japanese did not interfere with the administration of justice. In short, I have done my best to replace the reign of terror under the Japanese with a reign of law under a Constitutional Government with considerable success and I have not done anything improper or against the interests of the country and the people.
36. I have tried to make my statement as full as possible but I am handicapped as I do not know on what points information is required. If it be found to be defective in respect of any particular question I shall willingly supplement it with answers at my examination.

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Examination of U Thein Maung (DCPI/O38)

2.6.45.

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Sir J. A. Maung Gyi and I and others were made to live in the houses in the same street. The Japanese probably thought that if the leading members of the Burmese Community live in Sagaing the general public would return. When I and the others mentioned in my statement went to Maymyo on the 19th May 1942, we were each in turn asked for our views on a Constitution for Burma. I pointed out the first immediate necessity was the restoration of law and order. I then said that old Government servants should be employed and was asked by the Japanese whether they would remain loyal to the Japanese. I replied that most of them would not be



likely to turn against the Japanese but in any case they were the most suitable persons to restore quieter conditions. I also said that the question of constitution should be considered later. I do not know what the other members of the party said. They told me afterwards their views were substantially the same as mine.

From May 1942 up to April 1943 I had no connection with political matters. I lived first in Rangoon and later in Paungáe. In April 1943 Dr. Ba Maw sent me a telegraph asking me to serve as a member of the Burmese Independence Preparatory Committee. I was also urged by Sir Mya Bu to accept offer as it was more a military order than anything else and it would be unwise to refuse it. I went to Rangoon at the beginning of May 1943 and served on the Commission. At the meetings I soon realized that the Commission was not given a free hand and that if the discussions were proceeding in a way which did not suit the Japanese we were soon informed as to what we should do. For instance, the Japanese said that the Head of the State must not be designated either King or President, that the Head of State must also be the Prime Minister and that there must also be a separate office of Prime Minister, and also that there must not be a legislature. The majority of the members of the Commission were supported by Dr. Ba Maw and his suggestions were always what the Japanese wanted. I led the opposition and was generally supported by Thakins Tun Ok and Ba Sein, U Set, Hanzada U Mya and a few others, but we were always out-voted. I was in favour of a Legislature as in my opinion it was impossible to form a responsible government without one. I pointed out that this Commission had to decide very important matters and said that the proceedings should be made public including the communications from the Japanese authorities. This proposal was turned down and we were told that the proceedings were Japanese Military secrets and any one disclosing that the proceedings were Japanese Military secrets and any one disclosing them would be very severely punished. This was nothing more than a threat.

I was appointed to the Negotiations Committee, the other members of which were Dr. Ba Maw, Thakin Aung San, Thakin Than Tun, U Ba Win and U Tun Aung. I was the only member of the Committee who was not a member of Ba Maw's party. At the Committee meeting Japanese had speeches written in Japanese and these were read out by Burmese interpreters into English and we then made notes and later put these views before the Commission. I asked for copies

of the speeches but they refused to give them to me. In other words, the Committee merely acted as a mouth-piece for the Japanese. Japanese gave the Commission a draft of the Declaration of Independence and the Commission then drew up its own draft incorporating what was laid down by the Japanese. This draft was then sent for approval, to the Military Administration. I knew nothing of declaration of war until Dr. Ba Maw actually read it out. Nobody signed this except by Dr. Ba Maw. I was only offered the appointment of Minister the day before the declaration was made, i.e., 31st July, 1943. I did not refuse the appointment; I knew that there were a large number of questions to be settled and I considered that if I accepted office I should be able to do something in the interests of the people of the country. The Japanese did not interfere with me as a Minister but they did interfere in the Judicial Administration of the district, and I constantly had to protest against this interference with the administration of justice. I was supported in this by others, particularly by Sir Mya Bu, who was then Chief Justice. I did not make any broadcast but made two public speeches one at Government House and one at the Shwedagon Pagoda. On the first occasion I spoke on the creation of the Mahabama Asi Ayon. I said that the creation of this Association was a correct thing as it was to unite all the various tribes and races of Burma. On the second occasion I spoke on the 'Blue Print' and stated that the Secretary of State's declaration that the Governor's rule should last for an indefinite period was unsatisfactory and that even a period of six years recommended in the 'Blue Print' was too long. This speech was made by me about the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945.

I took no particular active part in the actual Government of the country. Everyone from Dr. Ba Maw downwards was dissatisfied with the way in which Japanese controlled everything. Any scheme for the benefit of the country was either pigeon-holed or rejected, by the Japanese authorities. I never visited Japan.

Even the Privy Council could do very little and bills were first referred for approval to the Japanese and then sent to the Privy Council. In the case of two bills Dr. Ba Maw did insist after a considerable delay that they should be placed before the Privy Council even though the Japanese had not approved of them. Ultimately the Bills were enacted but Dr. Ba Maw had to give an undertaking that Nipponese interests in Burma would not be affected.



Had I refused office I should certainly have come under the suspicion of the Japanese Military Police as being anti-Japanese with possible serious consequences. I most certainly did not approve of the Japanese.

I was never told to evacuate to India. I never actually contemplated evacuating as I firmly believed that the invasion would be halted on the Pyinmana-Magwe line. And even when the occupation was complete I was certain that Allied troops would return very shortly.

Signed before me

R. O. & A.C.

(Signature. C.H. RAYNES  
Col. (int.)  
(Date) 2.6.45.

Signature: THEIN MAUNG  
(Date) 2.6.45.

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(True Copy)

/s/  
(C.B. ONI.)  
Dy. Inspector-General of Police,  
C.I.D., Burma, Rangoon.





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及私ヲ含ムガイン・ビルに避難者、數人ニ對シテ「ガイ  
ン町」本町ニ移ツテ彼、割居テタ家ニ入ル様ニ求メマシタ、其如  
ク私ハ町（移ラズバナラズ）新ニイ日本憲兵隊事務所ノ真  
正面ニ在ッタ家ニ入ラナレバナラカッタデス。

私ハ前記ノ家ニ一九四三年八月十七日迄留マラナレバナリマセンデス  
即チ三月ヨ起ユルト數日デ同期間中私ハ日本憲兵隊ノ  
性ニ付テ目撃者又ハ痛知リタ事ニ慄然トシテ居リマシタ、

七、私ハ日本憲兵隊ノ將校ニヨツテ一九四三年五月十九日「マイミヨウ」ニ他ノ  
人連ト共ニ連レテ行ケタ、即チ「コー・アイ」(元内相)「コー・バイン」(元内相)  
「コー・バーベ」(元著名ナルM.H.R)及「コー・セツ」博士「C.I.E」(元ラ  
ンゲン・コー・ポレイ・シヨノ市委員)等デアル。

ソコデ我等ハ幾人カノ日本陸軍將校ト會見シタカ「ビル」ハ如何  
ニシテ統治セラルベキカラ又如何ニスレバ平和ト秩序カ回復セラルベキ  
カラ我等ハ私等ニ訊ネタ、

八、同夜「マイミヨウ」カラ歸ルヤ「コー・アイ」、「コー・バイン」及私ハ「タ  
レ」ニ於ケル日本憲兵隊ノ宿舎ニ於テ同隊ノ將校及下士官  
數名ト共ニソノ夜ヲ過サナレバナラナカッタ、

九、當時通俗的ニハ「ホー・モギヨウ」トシテ知ラレタ一人ノ日本將校  
ハ彼「コナレ」滞在中同月ノ五日ト思ウガ「マウングギ」卿ト私ト  
チ呼ビ出シマシタ、「マウングギ」卿ガ最初ニ彼ト會ヒマシタ、彼ハソレ  
カラ最早ヤ時間ガナイト私ニ告ゲ言フベキ必要ノアツタ事ハ「マウ  
ングギ」ニ話シタコト並ニ手紙ガ私ニ必要ナ情報ヲ與ヘルデロ  
ウト言フコト又ケラ私ニ告ゲタ、「マウングギ」卿ハ夫レカラ「ホー・モギヨ  
ウ」ガ彼「マウングギ」卿ト私トハ日本ノ政權ト下ニ於テハ如何ナル役職モ





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十四、一九四三年四月三日、私が「バウニ」に居た頃、英國側が「ビルマ」を撤退  
退ニテカラ約二年、後ニ當時日本軍政下ニ於テ總理大臣デマワ  
所「バーモウ」博士カラ「ビルマ」獨立準備委員會一員トシテ  
奉仕ニ且「ビルマ」統治、爲、憲法、準備ニ助力セリ度キ旨ヲ  
懇請シテ電報、通知ラ受ケタリタ  
此、通知「バーモウ」地方事務官（「ニヤセイ」ニ「ニヤ」）ニ送リ、後者ハ  
「バウニ」ニ於ケル私ニ直接手交セシメル爲ニ一人、警察官  
ヲ派遣シタリタ

十五、私ハ「ニヤ」卿（元「ニヤ」高等司法裁判所判事）カラ前  
記委員會ニ奉仕ヲ促進スル手紙ヲ受取ツタ。其手紙ハ私ハ  
日本軍政部、命令デ「バウニ」ヲ希望デリ、且「此」委員會ニ  
奉仕スルコトヲ拒絶スルコトハ危險ニ非ストモスルト不適當デアルト  
「印象」興テ、此「印象」他情報ニヨリテモ確認セリタ

十六、私ハ「ニヤ」卿（博士）「ニヤ」卿「ニヤ」卿「ニヤ」卿  
セト「博士」ハ「ニヤ」卿（元内相）及「ニヤ」卿（元「ニヤ」  
「ニヤ」大學「M. H. R」等、貴顯デ、英國政府ニ對スル中、  
誠ニ疑フベクモ無人達モ示前記委員會一委員ニ「ニヤ」  
「ニヤ」情報ヲ受取ツタ。

十七、以テ、如キ状況、下ニ在リテ又「ビルマ」政治、爲、最近「ニヤ」憲  
法ニ關聯シテ、私が重要ナル役割即チ一九一九年—一九二〇年  
「マド」ハ「ビルマ」代表一員トシテ又一九三三年—三四年  
英國兩院、合同協議委員會ニ於スル證據提示、  
爲「ビルマ」便節團一員トシテ、役割ヲ演ヂタ事實ニ鑑  
ミテ、私ハ前記委員會ニ奉仕スルコトヲ拒絶スルニ日本軍  
政部ヲ納得セシメル口實が無イト感シタ。





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二三 其途ヲ私、委員会、指導的後勤ニ就キ、彼等、  
相立列シ、聞ハネバ、ナラサルヲ。 本員会、全量達  
ノ全部ヲナクシ、大部分ノ人達、私ガ心ニ人ノ名  
ニ勇、敢且ツ執拗ニ闘フコト、又私ガ式ニ程度ヲ  
憲法ヲ自由ナラシメ、トルコトニ成功ニタコトヲ証言  
シテ、フルデアラツト信ス。

二十四 本員会、成立、頭初ヨリ交渉本員会ヲ作シ来  
テ、ナラツタ。 此、交渉本員会、任務、国家的、重要  
性ナル種ニ、問題ヲ此、目的、ナキニ特ニ設テ、  
日本側本員会ヲ通シテ、日本軍政当局ト交  
渉スルコトヲアツタ。 上述本員会、貢トミテ、私、  
日本側トノ交渉ニテ、許サレ、ナラ、交渉、ヨリモ日  
本側本員会ニヨル命令、方ガ、ナリ、又極ニ重  
要ナ、数々ノ問題ガ、彼等ノ主張ニヨリ、独立宣言後  
ニ解決サル可キトミテ、放棄セ、ネバ、ナラ、又コトヲ知リ  
マシタ。

二十五 本員会、憲法ノ種々ナ、部分ヲ出スルヨリ、寧ろ  
日本軍政当局ニ提出セ、ネバ、ナラ、ス、夫レハ、日本政府ニ廻  
付サレ、承認ヲ受ケ、ネバ、ナラ、ツタ、ナラ、ズ。

二十六 日本軍政当局ハ、本員会ニ独立宣言ヲ準備ス  
ル務、要請ニテ、来タ。 其際、彼等ガ、本員会ニ期  
待スル所ヲ、示ス、ナリ、ノ、宣言草案ガ、提供サレタ。  
ソニテ、本員会ニ依リ、起草ナリ、宣言文ハ、彼等ノ、

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ノ承認ヲ得ル者ニ復等ニ因送サレ奉<sup>ル</sup>ナラシムト  
思ヒマス。

三十一、本委員会(上述ニテ稱ス理由ニ依リ)意思及ニ  
独立宣言ニ付テ全般時ハナガ相立程度言旨  
ガアリニシタ。

三十二、然レニ本ラ本委員会ハ一九四三年八月日、国家省  
府ノ資格ニ付テハ「モウ」博立ニ依リ、なサタ同  
戦宣言ニ付テハ何等関知スル処デハアリデシタ。  
本委員会ハソレガ彼ニ付テ其ノ時公式ニ発表サル迄  
ニ付テ何モ和ラセデシタ。多クノ委員、其ノ日、行事  
ガ終了ニタトノ印象ニ及<sup>リ</sup>配サデタノデ役所ヲ去リカ  
ケラサマシタ。ソレヲ用ニ呼ビ歸サレ宣言ガ発表サル  
ハ非<sup>テ</sup>幸ニシタ。事<sup>ニ</sup>実<sup>ニ</sup>関<sup>ス</sup>戦<sup>ス</sup>、宣言ハ当日、議事  
ハ全然ツカツタノデア<sup>ル</sup>。此<sup>レ</sup>ニ独立宣言當日ノ概典  
細部計畫ノ為<sup>ニ</sup>テ<sup>ル</sup>附録Aヲ即讀下<sup>サ</sup>。

三十三、同ニ事ガ當日親任ニタ新大臣(私モ金主)  
ニツキモ云ヘマセ<sup>リ</sup>。私ハ旧大臣達ガ宣言ガナシ  
ルニト<sup>リ</sup>知<sup>リ</sup>テ居<sup>ラ</sup>シタ<sup>ド</sup>ウカハ判<sup>リ</sup>マセ<sup>ニ</sup>ガ<sup>ハ</sup>、  
彼等ハ宣言ガ實際発表サル迄知<sup>ラ</sup>ズ<sup>ニ</sup>思<sup>フ</sup>カ<sup>タ</sup>ト  
思<sup>フ</sup>マス。

三十四、私が司法大臣ノ職ヲ受<sup>ケ</sup>タ<sup>リ</sup>三<sup>ノ</sup>理由ハ次ノ通<sup>リ</sup>  
ナ<sup>リ</sup>デ<sup>ア</sup>リマス。

(一) 我ハ日本軍政部長オーセコ(大迫)氏ニ  
ヨリ就任ヲ命<sup>ジ</sup>ラ<sup>レ</sup>、天皇陛下ヨリ選<sup>ビ</sup>レ<sup>ル</sup>信<sup>任</sup>



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オレタノハ、モウ、博士ニ、協カズル、機、依、然、ナシ  
ソニテ、其時ノ、状況、下ニ、アツテ、ソノヲ、拒絶、スル、事  
ガ、有、言、デ、アル、ト、信、ジ、タ、カ、ラ、デ、アリ、ヌ、此、私ノ、危、惧、ハ、  
事、後、的、ニ、又、數、分、間、接、的、ニ、デ、ハ、アリ、ヌ、ガ、上、述、ノ、  
委、員、會、ニ、於、テ、私ノ、指、導、下、ニ、全、體、的、ニ、從、リ、タ、リ、  
キ、ニ、ト、ラ、ニ、オ、シ、及、ビ、タ、キ、ニ、バ、一、ヤ、リ、ニ、ノ、二、人、ガ、只、一、之、  
博、士、ノ、國、家、首、席、議、任、後、用、ニ、世、ヲ、國、外、ニ、追、放、セ、  
タ、事、實、ニ、モ、リ、テ、立、証、サ、レ、タ、リ、

(四) 同、時、ニ、私、ハ、次、ノ、事、ヲ、宣、認、ス、ル、コ、ト、ガ、主、張、ニ、タ、リ、  
即、チ、日、本、軍、事、局、ヲ、ウ、ノ、民、政、ノ、現、象、ノ、移、行、ガ、  
不、可、ニ、タ、リ、ヲ、獲、得、サ、レ、タ、リ、モ、又、下、述、ノ、主、張、ニ、民、政、所  
ガ、力、弱、ク、日、本、軍、事、局、ノ、影、響、ガ、從、テ、同、部、  
存、續、ス、ル、ニ、タ、リ、日、本、ノ、軍、政、廢、止、ニ、事、實、上、何  
等、效、果、ガ、ナ、イ、ト、云、フ、コ、ト、

(三) 委、員、會、ノ、文、涉、委、員、會、ニ、モ、文、涉、ハ、日、本、及、其、  
野、心、ニ、對、シ、テ、士、語、ト、活、動、ト、ノ、種、々、ノ、領、域、ニ、  
於、テ、止、ル、ニ、及、ビ、己、ノ、人、ノ、利、益、ヲ、防、衛、ス、ル、為、メ、  
ニ、國、際、問、題、ガ、解、決、サ、レ、タ、リ、迄、繼、續、サ、レ、タ、リ、  
ト、然、レ、ニ、タ、リ、上、述、委、員、會、ノ、宣、言、ニ、テ、私、ハ、日、本、  
ノ、意、圖、及、國、家、ト、人、民、ノ、利、益、ガ、日、本、ノ、為、蒙、ル、  
可、キ、損、害、ノ、程、度、ヲ、明、セ、シ、タ、リ、タ、リ、モ、又、ソ、ノ、主、張、  
迄、前、述、ノ、一、層、數、ニ、上、リ、タ、リ、

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(四) 私ハコトハ人ガ日本軍日本憲兵並ニ  
其ノ隨行者及日本商人ヨリ壓迫<sup>カウ</sup>解  
放サレルニハタスベキ事ガ永山<sup>マサ</sup>ツテナル  
ト感<sup>シ</sup>ニタ。

(五) 私ハコトハ司法行政ノ独立ガ實現セラ  
レ日本人ノ司法行政ノ令入ノ企圖ガ阻止  
サレネ<sup>ハ</sup>トラヌコトヲ感<sup>シ</sup>ニタ。

(六) 私ハ法律ト秩序ガ國ノ利益ノ益ニ嚴重ニ  
維持サレネ<sup>ハ</sup>トラヌト感<sup>シ</sup>ニタ。

(七) 私ハ上述ノ状況下ニテ責任ヲ回避スルコ  
トハ國家ニ對スル私ノ義務ヲ缺ク事ニナリト  
感<sup>シ</sup>ニタ。

(八) 私ハ又英國側ニ於テモ何等及好ハアリ得<sup>テ</sup>  
ト思<sup>ヒ</sup>ニタ何故ナラ。

(九) 國內ニ法律及秩序ガ維持サレルコトハ  
英國側ニトツテモ又利益ヲアツコト。



(四)「ビルマ」總督閣下「ビルマ」人ハ日本政權下ニテモ英國ニ奉仕スルコトが出来ルト既ニ放送セラレトノ報道カアリ、尙(ハ)私ハ就任ニ先キ五十二年以上モ待機致シテ居リマシタ。

三十一、司該大臣トシテノ在職期間中私ハ「ビルマ」政府及ビ「ビルマ」ノ權利ニ對スル日本ノ侵害ニ對シテ、自省關係ノ事柄ノミナラズ、閣議ニ附サレタ他省關係ノ事柄ニ就テモ常ニ反抗シテ来マシタ。上述ノ閣議ニ於ケル私ノ同僚ノ全テカ此ノ私ノ陳述ヲ支持スモノト信ジマス。

三十二、一九四四年十一月十八日日本軍司令官ニ宛テタ私ノ陳述書ノ要綱寫ヲ「ビルマ」人ノ利益ヲ防衛セントシタ私ノ努力ノ一例トシテ此處ニ附加致シマス。右ハ私ノ仕事及治勳ヲ幾ラカ明瞭ラシメルニ役立つヤセウ、私カ日本軍司令官ニ宛テテ聲明書ヲ作製シタ際「ミヤブ」卿及其他ノ人達カ同席シテオタコト及「ミヤブ」卿ハ司法行政ニ關スル日本側ノ干涉及戒嚴令發布ニ關シ、私ヲ援助シラタコトヲ附加致シテ置キマス。當時私カ上記ノ聲明ヲ爲シタル際心ニ留メテオタコト處ノ幾ツカノ事件ニ關係セル五ツノ記憶シテオタル事柄ヲマニ提出致シマス。

三十三、日本軍當局ハ一九四五年四月一日ヨリ各大臣ノ居宅ニ日本軍歩哨ト刑事ヲ配置シタ。即チ「ビルマ」軍カ日本軍ニ攻撃ヲ開始シタ數日後ヨリ一九四五年四月二十四日ニ至ルマデ、即チ彼等ノ「ラングーン」ヨリ





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メテ来々心タガ、私ハ如何ナル情報ヲ要求セシキ事  
ルカ知ラナク、不利ナク立場ニアリマス。

何カ特定ノ御質問、其ニ関シ御不審ガアリコ  
タナラバ私ハ訊問ニ答ヘテ其意ニ補足致シマ  
セウ。

「エー・テイ・エス・エス・エス」訊問(DUP-1031)  
一九四五年六月二日

「エー・テイ・エス・エス・エス」御、私、ソノミソノ他、人達、同街、  
住家ニ住ミハシマシタ。日本人達ハ「ビル」社会、要  
人達が「サドイン」ニ住ミテ居ル所ニ一般民衆モ歸ッ  
テ来リタラウト考ヘタデセウ。私ト私、陳述、申シ其、  
名前ヲ舉ゲタ人達が一九四二年五月十九日「アイミウ」ニ  
行ク時私達各自順番ニビルニ憲法ニツキ、私見ヲ  
求メシマシタ。私ハ第一、緊急命令ハ法律ト秩序  
ノ回復ニアルトテ指摘シマシタ。私ハ次々旧政府ノ  
役人ヲ用ヰギカアルト言ヒコシタガ日本人達ハソノ役人  
達が日本人ニ對シ忠誠ヲ示シタラウトカト尋ネテマ  
シタ。私ハ大抵ノ役人ハ日本人ニ反對スルヤウナコト  
ハナク思フガ何レニセヨ 平穩ナ状態ヲ回復  
スルニハ彼等ガ最適任者ニアルト答  
ヘマシタ。

私ハ亦、憲法問題ハソノ後ニ考慮スベキデ





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又、我が利達、常傳書手頁々々、私意見トシテ立憲府  
十二合理政府ヲ建テシモノ不可能ナリ故私立法  
府ノ設置ヲ希望スル私父、委員會、非常ニ會中事  
項ヲ決議シケバエリトシテ指摘シ、議事録、日本官  
憲ヨリ通信文ヲ今日之ヲ公開スベキナリト云ヒタマフ。  
此提議ハ却下サレ私達、議事録、日本軍事故案  
アリ、ソコ漏洩スル者誰デ天嚴罰ニ処スト言ヒ渡井  
シタマフ。之威嚇以上ノ何レ今モアヤナク。

[illegible]





Doc 27054

$$= f(a) + f'(a) \frac{1}{2} (x-a)^2 + \frac{1}{6} f''(c) (x-a)^3$$

松、印度、明治元々、言にヨリテナシ。松、優待、明治十一年  
が正統子、世に於ては、確信、ミナモト、實際、明治十二年  
より、日論、ミナモト、ミナモト、ミナモト、完了、呼子、松  
い、聯合軍、ミナモト、常子、ミナモト、確信、ミナモト

[illegible]

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C. H. 2-12 (2/2/2)

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1942年 12月 1日 星期一

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蘇東坡詩集卷之四

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